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COMMENTARY
NEW STRUCTURES, NEW ATTITUDES, OR BOTH: A
COMMENT ON PROFESSOR COX'S ARTICLE
LUCIUS J. BARKER*
For some time I have profited greatly from views that Professor Cox
has presented through his writing. The same holds true for this article.
I find many areas of agreement. Nevertheless, I would like to state
briefly some concerns that occurred to me as I read and thought about
Professor Cox's article and related matters.
Might it not be that, in our focus on the increased role of courts in
policymaking, we have given insufficient attention to the relative roles
and functions of other political institutions such as Congress and the
Presidency? Might it not be that, given their greater insulation from
popular pressures, the courts may be in the best position to exert lead-
ership on certain tough issues such as race and reapportionment?
Might it not also be that the reason litigation appears to be more of a
"normal part" of the policy process is the inability or unwillingness, or
perhaps a lack of popular confidence in the capacity, of our elective
political institutions to deal with these issues?
Certainly, Professor Cox noted some of these matters, especially in
his references to the bold judicial strokes that courts might need to
paint from time to time, but I think that we must continue to examine
the relative roles and functions of our governmental institutions for
their relative capacities and performance and their relation and inter-
dependence in the governing process. In short, the judiciary's role must
be continuously viewed in the context of our total political system.
This context might reveal more clearly not only the dependence of the
courts on political institutions, but also how courts might help these
institutions by conferring legitimacy on their actions and, at times, by
serving as a guide and leader on certain key issues.'
* Edna Fischel Gellhorn University Professor of Public Affairs and Professor of Political
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1. See generally Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PuB. L. 279 (1957).
Washington University Open Scholarship
830 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The real breakthrough in the new equality for minorities came in the
1954 Brown2 decision. Thereafter, court decisions, congressional laws,
and presidential initiatives all built on the principle thrusts of Brown.
In the late 1960's, however, we began to see changes in the political
climate, in the Presidency, in Supreme Court personnel, and in the tone
and substance of Court decisions relative to equality. In recent times as
well, we have seen voluminous materials critical of judicial forays into
policy matters. All this activity has resulted in a slowdown-even a
retreat-from the egalitarian thrusts of the 1950's and 1960's.
To what extent does this represent a retrenchment from the princi-
ples of Brown and an erosion of its very foundations? After all, Brown
is relatively new to our constitutional-legal fabric--only twenty-five
years old! To what extent does this activity portend an era of subtle but
effective exclusion of racial or other minorities from various opportuni-
ties? I am especially struck by the gross inequities and disparities that
women and minorities still suffer in various social indicators of equality
such as employment, housing, income, and education. I am also struck
by the continuing lack of representation that many of these groups
have in professional schools, university faculties, and councils of gov-
ernment, including courts. In these contexts, cries of "reverse discrimi-
nation" project a very hollow ring, at least in my ears. At bottom, my
real concern reduces to this question: if courts no longer exist as access
points for these groups, or if they somehow attempt to withdraw from
the battle, what effect will it have on our overall progress toward a
meaningful equality as envisioned in Brown? I agree with Professor
Cox that courts cannot do everything, but I do believe that courts can
do some things, especially in promoting the value of equality. Perhaps
they can create the kind of constitutional-legal climate that stirs other
institutions and interests to take positive actions. In the meanwhile, I
remain concerned that the current climate seriously jeopardizes further
positive actions to effect equality in America.
Professor Cox indicated, and I very much agree, that the Supreme
Court from time to time might have to make "new constitutional law
by bold strokes resting upon little more than sensitive perception of the
needs and enduring values of the nation."'3 The efficacy of bold
strokes, I take it, might depend in part upon the Court's becoming too
2. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. Cox, The Effect of The Searchfor Equality Upon Judicial Institutions, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q.
795, 814.
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embroiled on a continuing basis in policy management and policy im-
plementation. I wonder, however, whether some of this management
and implementation might be necessary for bold judicial strokes to be-
come meaningful? Especially might the judiciary have to do so if other
institutions fail to act in accordance with the bold strokes taken by the
Court. In short, we might face some sort of a dilemma. On the one
hand, too much involvement by the Court might well tarnish its legiti-
macy and hence effectiveness when the occasion arises for bold judicial
ventures. On the other hand, if the Court fails to implement its bold
ventures, then its standing might also be diminished. My belief is that
if the equality in Brown represents one of the "enduring values of the
nation"4 that demanded a bold judicial stroke, then the Court should
use its authority to promote a meaningful equality for those who for so
long have been deprived of that value.
Performance of this task, of course, can bring the courts into collision
with significant political forces and place the judiciary under great
stress. Judicial involvement in policy management and policy imple-
mentation matters also brings courts into closer proximity with direct
policy conflict and obviously poses greater risks to judicial legitimacy.
If the courts fail to perform a leadership role, however, who will or who
can? Although I do not wish the judiciary to overplay its hand, neither
do I wish it to refrain from the vital and special contributions it can
make in the political system. Again, I agree with Professor Cox that
the "question . . . is not whether a court can do everything, but
whether it can do something to repair a serious failure of the normal
processes of government." 5
Because of the judiciary's special role in the political system, sugges-
tions to relieve increasing pressures on courts are not only interesting,
but inviting as well. For this reason also, Professor Cox's idea to create
a legislative court, administrative agency, or some other tribunal stirs
immediate interest. On the practical side, however, I am somewhat
skeptical about whether Congress would approve of this sort of agency,
especially given the current political mood, and if so, whether that
agency would have sufficient authority and power to do an effective
job. I also wonder whether a new tribunal would ultimately lead to
more bureaucratic layers and build more delay into the realization of
4. Id.
5. Id. at 808.
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constitutional rights. More importantly, although new organizational
forms might prove useful, I wonder how much they will be able to insu-
late or relieve the pressure on the judiciary in dealing with these issues.
I suspect that the really tough issues will end up in the courts.
Having said this, however, I certainly can appreciate the general
thinking behind the idea and would like to know more, particularly on
how the proposed new agency would mesh with existing institutions.
What I really wonder, however, is whether we need new structures at
all, or whether what we really need is to build new attitudes and en-
hance the political support necessary to implement Court decisions that
promote the enduring values of the nation. Perhaps we need both.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss3/13
